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Abstract. A framework for assessing the robustness of long-duration repeti-
tive orchestrations in uncertain evolving environments is proposed. The model
assumes that service-based evaluation environments are stable over short time-
frames only; over longer periods service-based environments evolve as demand
fluctuates and contention for shared resources varies. The behaviour of a short-
duration orchestration E in a stable environment is assessed by an uncertainty
profile U and a corresponding zero-sum angel-daemon game Γ (U) [2]. Here the
angel-daemon approach is extended to assess evolving environments by means of
a subfamily of stochastic games. These games are called strategy oblivious be-
cause their transition probabilities are strategy independent. It is shown that the
value of a strategy oblivious stochastic game is well defined and that it can be
computed by solving a linear system. Finally, the proposed stochastic framework
is used to assess the evolution of the Gabrmn IT system.
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1 Introduction
Web services pervade modern life; commonplace examples include media and health-
care services. Complex applications can be (rapidly) built by interconnecting (or orches-
trating) a set of underlying services. Load balancing, provisioning, and failure modes
are fundamental issues for the cloud computing community; during an execution of
an application the performance of some component services may degrade because of
over-demand. However, cloud providers try to balance work-loads across computing
resources. The overall performance of an application is affected by the interplay be-
tween positive and negative (competing) environmental influences. One approach to
making service-based systems resilient is to use ad hoc techniques, based on the wis-
dom and folklore of experienced engineers. The goal of this paper is use formal methods
to reason about the resilience of long duration service-based systems.
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In [2] orchestration games are constructed, with one player (the daemon) mali-
ciously degrading a bounded number of services (to cause the maximum delay) and
the other player (the angel) applying bounded elasticity to improve performance. Un-
certainty profiles and strategic situations are used in [2] to characterise stable evaluation
environments. Nash equilibria are used to characterise the performance and resilience
of applications when subject to complex environmental influences. In this paper game
theory is applied to more complex scenarios where patterns of environmental stress
evolve throughout an application’s execution.
In order to analyse a long duration application which repeatedly evaluates an or-
chestration E we propose an extended stochastic uncertainty model. In the model ex-
ecution environments are assumed to remain stable during evaluations of E. However,
the environment may evolve between any of the periodic evaluations because of fluc-
tuations in demand. It is assumed that the number of evaluation environments is finite
and that evolution follows a Markovian process. Under this hypothesis the evolution
of the environment can be assessed by means of stochastic games in which the fu-
ture is described by means of a lottery. Stochastic games [8] have been widely used to
study the inter-temporal behaviour of “real” systems [3]. In a zero-sum stochastic game
Γ = 〈Γ 1, . . . , Γ `〉 each state l is formed by two components a zero sum game and a lot-
tery. In state l, a player engages in the zero-sum game and after moves probabilistically
to the next state.
For analyzing periodic orchestrations, it seems sufficient to consider oblivious lot-
teries, where the probability of changing state depends only on the current state. We
prove that (i) games in the family of (zero-sum) strategy oblivious stochastic games
have a well defined value, in the discounted model, and (ii) a game value can be com-
puted by solving a linear system. This result allows the proposed framework to be ap-
plied to analyse the behaviour of the Gabrmn system.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces periodic orchestrations
while Section 3 introduces zero-sum, stochastic and strategy oblivious games. Section 3
also provides techniques for assessing complex evolving scenarios (Theorem 2). In Sec-
tion 4 we discuss the assessment of both short- and long-duration orchestrations. The
behaviour of the Gabrmn system in an evolving environment is analysed in Section 5 .
Finally, we draw some conclusions in Section 6.
2 Periodic Orchestrations
The language Orc [5, 4] can be used to model the co-ordination of a set of loosely-
coupled services. Orc has a well defined semantics [10, 12] and so lends itself to the
study of orchestration behaviour.
The simplest Orc expression is a service call. When called a service responds by
publishing a result (for example a link to a web page). Three predefined services (or
internal sites) are used in this paper: 0, 1 and Rtimer(t). Service 0 never publishes; a
call to 1(x) echoes back its input argument x; a call to Rtimer(t) publishes a result
after t time steps. Any two orchestrations P andQ can be composed using the operators:
– Sequential composition P > x > Q(x): Initially P is evaluated: for each output
v, published by P , an instanceQ(v) is invoked. If P publishes the stream of values,
v1, v2, . . . vn, then orchestration P > x > Q(x) publishes some interleaving of the
set {Q(v1), Q(v2), . . . , Q(vn)}. The abbreviation P  Q is used in situations
where Q does not depend on x.
– Parallel composition P | Q: The independent orchestrations P and Q are exe-
cuted in parallel; P | Q publishes some interleaving of the values published by P
and Q.
– Pruning P (x) < x < Q: Orchestrations P and Q are evaluated in parallel; P may
become blocked by a dependency on x. The first result published by Q is bound
to x, the remainder of Q’s evaluation is terminated and evaluation of the blocked
residual of P is resumed.
Consider the periodic computation D =
(
E | (Rtimer(τ)  D)) which repeat-
edly calls a short-duration orchestration E, say E = (A | B) < x < (F | G), at time
intervals τ . It is assumed that the environment of E remains stable during any evalu-
ation. During a particular evaluation of E some underlying services may be degraded,
because of excessive demand, while other services may benefit from environmental re-
silience. The precise nature of the environmental factors in play at any one moment in
time is difficult to characterise in a quantitative way. A qualitative environmental char-
acterisation can be given using an uncertainty profile [2]. This specifies potential posi-
tive and negative environmental influences (e.g. overdemand, elasticity). The combined
effect of these influences on an evaluation of E can be assessed using game theory [2].
For a periodic evaluation the environmental influences may evolve from one time pe-
riod to the next. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate how stochastic games can be
used to analyse such evolving situations.
3 Preliminaries on Games
Zero-sum and stochastic zero-sum games are introduced below; Standard notation is
used throughout: ∆(S) denotes the set of probability distributions over a finite set S.
Zero-sum games can be used to model stable stressed environments.
Definition 1. A two player zero-sum game is a strategic game described by the tuple
Γ = 〈A1, A2, u〉. A1 and A2 are the set of eligible actions for player 1 and 2, respec-
tively. The third component is a mapping u from A1 × A2 to the rational numbers. An
element (i, j) ∈ A1×A2 is called a strategy profile. The utility of strategy profile (i, j)
is u(i, j), for player 1, and −u(i, j), for player 2. Utilities are rational numbers.
A mixed strategy is a lottery on the set of eligible actions. Utility u can be extended
over mixed strategy profiles. Given a mixed strategy profile (α, β) ∈ ∆(A1)×∆(A2)
where α = (α1, . . . , αn) and β = (β1, . . . , βm) then u(α, β) =
∑
i,j αiu(i, j)βj . The
value of a zero-sum game Γ is defined as ν(Γ ) = maxα∈∆(A1)minβ∈∆(A2) u(α, β).
For any (mixed) Nash equilibrium (α, β) it is known that u(α, β) = ν(Γ ).
Example 1. The class of 2 × 2-zero sum games is well-known [6]. Consider games
Γ = ({T,B}, {L,R}, u) and Γ ′ = ({T,B}, {L,R}, u′) below with utilities u and u′.
L R
T 1/2 1
B 1 1/2
Γ
L R
T 3 3/2
B 3/2 3
Γ ′
In a Nash equilibrium with full support u(T, β) = u(B, β) = ν(Γ ) and u(α,L) =
u(α,R) = ν(Γ ). Thus α = β = 1/2, ν(Γ ) = 3/4 and ν(Γ ′) = 9/4 uunionsq
The following linear transformation result for zero-sum games is well-known:
Lemma 1. Let Γ = (A1, A2, u) and Γ ′ = (A1, A2, u′) be two zero-sum games with
u′(i, j) = au(i, j) + b, for some a > 0. Then games Γ and Γ ′ have the same set of
Nash equilibria and ν(Γ ′) = a ν(Γ ) + b.
Following [6, 9] stochastic games are formally defined as:
Definition 2. A two person stochastic game Γ = 〈Γ 1, . . . , Γ `〉 is a tuple of ` sub-
games. Each sub-game (or state) Γ l has form Γ l = 〈gamel(Γ ), lotteriesl(Γ )〉. Here
gamel(Γ ) is a zero-sum game and lotteriesl(Γ ) determines the next game:
– gamel(Γ ) = 〈Al1, Al2, ul〉 where Al1 = {1, · · · , nl}, Al2 = {1, . . . ,ml}, and
– lotteriesl(Γ ) : Al1 ×Al2 → ∆
({1, . . . , `}).
When appropriate gamel(Γ ) and lotteriesl(Γ ) can be abbreviated to gamel and lotteriesl.
Example 2. A stochastic game Γ can be represented by a bi-matrix for each state com-
bining utility and lottery. For instance,
L R
T 1/2, (1/3, 2/3) 1, (2/3, 1/3)
B 1, (2/3, 1/3) 1/2, (1/3, 2/3)
Γ 1
L R
T 3, (1/4, 3/4) 3/2, (3/4, 1/4)
B 3/2, (3/4, 1/4) 3, (1/4, 3/4)
Γ 2
represents Γ = 〈Γ 1, Γ 2〉 where game1 = Γ and game2 = Γ ′ are the games in
Example 1 and, for instance, lotteries1({T, L}) = (1/3, 2/3). uunionsq
A stochastic game is played through so called stationary strategies [8]. A stationary
strategy is a pair (α, β) formed by α = (α1, . . . , α`) and β = (β1, . . . , β`) where, for
any 1 ≤ l ≤ `, αl ∈ ∆(Al1) and βl ∈ ∆(Al2). Thus a stationary strategy comprises
a mixed strategy profile for each game state. Lotteries are extended on mixed strate-
gies as lotterieslk(αl, βl) =
∑
i,j α
l
ilotteries
l
k(i, j)β
l
j where lotteries
l
k denotes the k
component of lotteriesl.
Example 3. A stationary strategy, for the game Γ given in Example 2, where player 1
selects T in game1 and B in game2 while player 2 chooses L in game1 and R in
game2, is ((α1, α2), (β1, β2)) = (((1, 0), (0, 1)), ((1, 0), (0, 1))) uunionsq
A stochastic game defines a collection of never ending games, one for each initial (sub-
game) state. In a game players are rewarded and use a joint lottery to determine the next
state. The λ-discounted reward model, 0 < λ < 1, is used to define a utility for a sta-
tionary strategy. Consider the game with initial state Γ l and with a stationary strategy
(α, β). In the λ-discounted reward model the total payoff for player 1 is computed solv-
ing Plλ(α, β) = λu
l(αl, βl)+(1−λ)∑k lotterieslk(αl, βl)Pkλ(α, β). In the following
Γ [λ] denotes the stochastic game Γ with a discount factor λ.
Example 4. Consider the stochastic game Γ [λ] with stationary strategy (α, β) from Ex-
ample 3 where the game starts in state 1. Initially player 1 wins λ/2 (and player 2 loses
−λ/2). The next game has discount factor (1 − λ); Γ 1 is played with probability 1/3
and Γ 2 with probability 2/3. LetP1 = P1(α, β) andP2 = P2(α, β) be the discounted
pay-offs of player 1, playing strategy (α, β), starting from Γ 1 and Γ 2, respectively. The
recursive structure of Γ [λ] gives rise to the following equations:
P1 = λ
1
2
+ (1− λ)(1
3
P1 +
2
3
P2), P2 = λ3 + (1− λ)(1
4
P1 +
3
4
P2)
and so P1(α, β) = (51− 39λ)/2(11 + λ) and P2(α, β) = (51 + 21λ)/2(11 + λ) uunionsq
Shapley showed that any stochastic game Γ = 〈Γ 1, . . . , Γ `〉 has optimal strategies and
a unique value vector v = (v1, . . . , v`). Given the stochastic game Γ , a numerical vector
w = (w1, . . . , w`) and a discount factor λ, he defined the zero sum games Γ l[λ,w] =
〈Al1, Al2, ul[λ,w]〉 where ul[λ,w](i, j) = λul(i, j)+ (1−λ)
∑`
k=1 lotteries
l
k(i, j)w
k,
and he proved the following theorem that characterizes v as a fix point.
Theorem 1 ([8]). Let Γ = 〈Γ 1, . . . , Γ `〉 be a stochastic game and let 0 < λ < 1.
Then v(Γ [λ]) = v = (v1, . . . v`) where v is the unique solution of the system vl =
ν(Γ l[λ, v]), l = 1, . . . , `. One optimal stationary strategy for Γ [λ] consists of playing
an optimal strategy at node l for the one shot game Γ l[λ, v].
Example 5. Letw = (w1, w2). Then the zero-sum auxiliary games Γ 1[λ,w] and Γ 2[λ,w]
below are derived for the stochastic games in Examples 2 and 4:
L R
T λ 1
2
+ (1− λ)( 1
3
w1 + 2
3
w2
)
1λ+ (1− λ)( 2
3
w1 + 1
3
w2
)
B 1λ+ (1− λ)( 2
3
w1 + 1
3
w2
)
1
2
λ+ (1− λ)( 1
3
w1 + 2
3
w2
)
Γ 1[λ,w]
L R
T 3λ+ (1− λ)( 1
4
w1 + 3
4
w2
)
3
2
λ+ (1− λ)( 3
4
w1 + 1
4
w2
)
B 3
2
λ+ (1− λ)( 3
4
w1 + 1
4
w2
)
3λ+ (1− λ)( 1
4
w1 + 3
4
w2
)
Γ 2[λ,w]
From Theorem 1 we have, v(Γ [λ]) = v = (v1, v2) where v1 = ν(Γ 1[λ, v]) and v2 =
ν(Γ 2[λ, v]). Using the mixed equilibria in Example 1 we have v1 = 34λ+
1
2 (v
1+v2)(1−
λ) and v2 = 94λ+
1
2 (v
1+v2)(1−λ). Thus, v = (v1, v2) = (12 (3− 32λ), 12 (3+ 32λ)) uunionsq
Oblivious-uncertainty provides a model of the future that is strategy-independent:
1 2
x
y
1− x 1− y
Fig. 1. A two state regular Markov chain.
Definition 3. A stochastic game Γ = 〈Γ 1, . . . , Γ `〉 is strategy oblivious if each state
1 ≤ l ≤ `, lotteriesl is a constant function (the same value for all (i, j) ∈ Al1 ×Al2).
Given an oblivious game, let vgame be the vector containing the values of the zero-sum
state games. Writing lotteriesl = ll, the lotteries corresponding to the different states
are given in the following LOTTERIES matrix:
vgame =
ν(game
1)
...
ν(game`)
 , LOTTERIES =
 l
1
...
l`
 =
 l
1
1 · · · l1`
...
...
l`1 · · · l``

Here LOTTERIES is a stochastic matrix (each row sums to 1) and llk denotes the
probability of moving from state l to state k. Recall that a stationary distribution p =
(p1, · · · , p`) is a distribution satisfying p · LOTTERIES = p.
Theorem 2. Let Γ = 〈Γ 1, . . . , Γ `〉 be a discounted strategy oblivious stochastic game,
0 < λ < 1. Then:
1. The value vector v = v(Γ [λ]) satisfies v = λ vgame+ (1− λ)LOTTERIES · v
2. The value vector v is v = λ
(
I − (1− λ)LOTTERIES)−1vgame.
3. If p is a stationary then p · v = p · vgame.
In the general case, the non-linearity of the equations in Theorem 1 defining v(Γ [λ])
makes it difficult to compute the exact value of a discounted stochastic game. In fact,
a stochastic game defined on rational data can have an irrational value vector [11]. In
the oblivious case the value vector v can be expressed as a linear system over values of
local state games (Theorem 2). Thus, as the computation of vgame can be reduced to
linear programming, assuming strategy obliviousness and rational data the result vector
v is kept within the rationals.
Example 6. Let Γ = 〈Γ 1, Γ 2〉 be a strategy oblivious stochastic game. The matrix
LOTTERIES corresponds to a 2 states Markov chain (see Fig. 1). Let
LOTTERIES =
(
l11 l
1
2
l21 l
2
2
)
=
(
(1− x) x
y (1− y)
)
, p = (p1, p2) =
( y
x+ y
,
x
x+ y
)
where 0 < x, y < 1 and p is a stationary distribution. Suppose that ν(game1) = a and
ν(game2) = b. The linear system derived from Theorem 2 is:(
v1
v2
)
= λ
(
a
b
)
+ (1− λ)
(
(1− x) x
y (1− y)
)(
v1
v2
)
4 An Assessment Model for Periodic Orchestrations
In this section an assessment model for orchestrations in stable environments [2] is
reviewed and extended to encompass periodic orchestrations in evolving environments.
Uncertainty profiles and a/d-games. Let E be a non-recursive orchestration which,
when called, publishes a finite set of results and terminates. The environment for E is
assumed to be uncertain but stable. Let α+(E) be the set of sites called byE (excluding
0). Let #s denote the cardinality of a set of sites s.
The assessment of E under stress is undertaken by specifying those services which
have the potential to be affected by stress. An uncertainty profile U models the a priori
perception of orchestration behaviour under stress [2], providing a model that lies be-
tween over-optimism and over-pessimism. A profile U , fixes two subsets of α+(E), A
andD, together with the number of service failures that can be expected to occur within
bothA andD. The last component of U is a utility u function which measures resilience
under a given type of stress. Behaviour is analyzed by assuming that service failures in
A (angelic services) are selected to cause the least amount of damage whereas service
failures in D (daemonic services) are selected to maximise damage to the application.
The assessment of E goes though a zero-sum game Γ (U) , the a/d-game, providing an
analysis of the competitive scenario [2]. Formally:
Definition 4 (uncertainty profile U and its associated a/d-game [2]).
– An uncertainty profile for an orchestration E is a tuple U = 〈E,A,D, bA, bD, u〉
whereA∪D ⊆ α+(E), bA ≤ #A, bD ≤ #D and u(a, d) ≥ 0 is a utility function
defined for all a ⊆ α+(E), d ⊆ α+(E).
– U = 〈E,A,D, bA, bD, u〉 has an associated zero-sum angel-daemon game Γ (U) =
〈Aa, Ad, u〉 with two players, a (angel) and d (daemon). Player a selects a set with
size bA from A: Aa = {a ⊆ A | #a = bA}. Player d selects a set with size bD
from D: Ad = {d ⊆ D | #d = bD}. Services in α+(E) \ (a ∪ d) remain reliable.
– The assessment ν(U) of an uncertainty profile U is defined to be the value of its
associated angel-daemon ν(Γ (U)).
Utility u(a, d) measures the degree of resilience of E when a ”selects” services a and
d ”selects” services d. Different utilities can be used to define different resilience mea-
sures. Three utilities with different weightings are shown:
uo(a, d) =
1
2
out(faila∩d(E)), ur(a, d) =
3
2
out(faild\a(E)), uw(a, d) = out(faila∪d(E))
Here the function out(failf (E)) returns the number of outputs published by E when
services in the set f fail. In the overloaded environment, uo, services selected by both
a and d fail. In the robust environment, ur, the angel has the capability to prevent its
selected service from failing. In a failures-prone weak environment , uw, neither a or d
can avoid failures.
Example 7. BigTwo = (G | A) can operate in Uo = 〈BigTwo, {G,A}, {G,A}, 1, 1, uo〉
describing an overloaded environment or in Ur = 〈BigTwo, {G,A}, {G,A}, 1, 1, ur〉
giving a robust environment or in Uw = 〈BigTwo, {G,A}, {G,A}, 1, 1, uw〉 givng a
weak one. The games Γ (Uo), Γ (Ur) and Γ (Uw) are
ad
{G} {A}
{G} 1/2 1
{A} 1 1/2
Γ (Uo)
a
d
{G} {A}
{G} 3 3/2
{A} 3/2 3
Γ (Ur)
a
d
{G} {A}
{G} 1 0
{A} 0 1
Γ (Uw)
Assessments are ν(Uo) = 3/4 and ν(Ur) = 9/4 (Example 1) and ν(Uw) = 1/2. uunionsq
Uncertainty profiles for periodic orchestrations. The assessment of the periodic or-
chestration is modelled using stochastic games. Possible execution environments of E
are defined by uncertainty profiles.
Definition 5. Let D =
(
E | (Rtimer(t)  D)). An uncertainty profile for E is a
tuple U = 〈U1, . . . ,U`, lotteries1, . . . , lotteries`〉, where, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ `, U i is an
uncertainty profile over E and lotteriesi ∈ ∆({1, . . . , `}) is collection of associated
lotteries, one lottery for each strategy profile in the game Γ (U i). Profile U induces an
associated stochastic a/d game Γ (U) = 〈Γ 1, . . . , Γ `〉 where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ `, Γ l =
〈Γ (U l), lotteriesl〉. Let 0 < λ < 1 be a discount value, if v(Γ (U)[λ]) = (v1, . . . , v`)
then the assessment of D under U is defined as ν(U) = v1.
Example 8. The orchestration BigTwo∗ =
(
BigTwo | (Rtimer(day)  BigTwo∗))
is assessed by the uncertainty profile U = 〈Uo,Ur, lotterieso, lotteriesr〉. Here tu-
ples 〈Γ (Uo), lotterieso〉 and 〈Γ (Ur), lotteriesr〉 correspond respectively to Γ 1 and Γ 2
components in Example 2. The associated stochastic game has been analyzed in Ex-
ample 5 where it is shown that v(Γ (U)) = ( 12 (3 − 32λ), 12 (3 + 32λ)). Therefore the
assessment of BigTwo∗ is 12 (3− 32λ). uunionsq
5 Example: The Gabrmn System
Gabrmn is an IT system for managing clinical data generated from magnetic reso-
nance spectra [2] . It comprises a number of sub-systems. Clinical data is stored in
a sub-system Databases . Clinical applications, including IDL, are stored on server,
Apps . A master server, Proxy , controls system behaviour. Email is a key service pro-
vided by servers Mail and Mirror ; the sub-system 1(x) < x < (Mail | Mirror) has
built-in redundancy. Service Backup allows system recovery to take place. Gabrmn is
modelled in Orc as;
IT System = Proxy  ((1(x) < x < (Mail | Mirror)) | Apps | Backup | Databases)
This expression is a stylized formalization developed after extensive discussion with
the Gabrmn system manager (A. Garcı´a) - see http://gabrmn.uab.es/. The
number of outputs (uw = out(faila∪d)) published by IT System provides a measure
of its “well-being” (maximum value 4). The long term behaviour of IT System in
stressed environments is modelled by the following stochastic game:
States. Taking uw = out(faila∪d), three different environments for Gabrmn are:
U1 = 〈IT System, {Backup,Proxy ,Mirror}, {Apps,Databases,Mail}, 1, 1, uw〉
U2 = 〈IT System, {Apps,Mail ,Mirror}, {Databases,Mail ,Mirror}, 1, 1, uw〉
U3 = 〈IT System, {Apps,Mail ,Mirror}, {Databases,Mail ,Mirror}, 2, 1, uw〉
Fig. 2. Assessments v1 (left) and v3 (right) of U with x = y = z ∈ {1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, 0.15}. In
both figures the value 1 corresponds to the rightmost curve and 0.15 the the leftmost.
Here a service fails if it is selected by either a or d. Profiles U1, U2, U3 induce games
with valuations ν(U1) = ν(U2) = 3 and ν(U3) = 2.
Evolution of the environment. The parameterised uncertainty profile U(x, y, z) mod-
els system evolution through environments 〈U1,U2,U3〉 using an oblivious approach
where
vgame =
ν(U1)ν(U2)
ν(U3)
 =
33
2
 , LOTTERIES =
1− x x 00 1− y y
z 0 1− z

LOTTERIES models a perturbed round trip 1→ 2→ 3→ 1with a probability to keep
into the current state. The stochastic game Γ (U)whereU = 〈U1,U2,U3,LOTTERIES〉
satisfies:
v = λ
1− (1− λ)(1− x) −(1− λ)x 00 1− (1− λ)(1− y) −(1− λ)y
−(1− λ)z 0 1− (1− λ)(1− z)
−1 vgame
This equation has been solved, using the Python SymPy library, to find the value vector
v = (v1, v2, v3) for certain values of x, y and z and discount factors – see Fig. 2. Setting
x = 1, y = 1 and z = 1 gives an environment with a deterministic full round trip (next
is to 1 → 2 → 3 → 1). When x = y = z the assessment v1 increases monotonically
as the probability of remaining in the first state increases (i.e. x decreases). As λ → 1
the assessment v1 in the discounted model is weighted towards today’s performance
(ν(U1) = 3 – see Fig. 5 left). Fig. 5 right shows the assessment v3, which corresponds
to the game starting in the least reliable environment, U3: decreasing the probability
of remaining in this state monotonically improves system performance. Similar results
have been obtained for asymmetric case: y = z and x = y/2.
6 Conclusions
The angel-daemon approach has been extended to assess periodic orchestrations in
evolving environments. We have considered the subfamily of strategy oblivious stochas-
tic games in which transition probabilities are independent of selected strategies. It has
been shown that such games have well-defined valuations. The proposed framework
has been used to assess the evolution of the Gabrmn IT system. We are in the process
of identifying larger systems that can be cast naturally in our approach.
Our approach may go some way to answering a fundamental question of application
developers: how can the resilience of service-based systems be assessed when some
sub-components are subject to unpredictable forms of stress (e.g. contention for re-
sources on a hypervisor)? Typically practitioners use ad hoc techniques, guided by their
technical experience, to develop robust systems of micro-services. It is unclear how the
uncertainty associated with a cloud (and services deployed therein) can be modelled
realistically by using probabilistic techniques (because sudden surges in demand can
occur, or the types of resource available may change in an unpredictable way). Here we
provide a different approach which (partially) removes probabilities from the analysis
of a natural strategic situation. Our approach provides a formal method for the analysis
of an increasingly important class of architectures (until now analysed by trial-and-error
techniques). We are working towards extending the approach by adding latency to the
set of components that can be influenced by mixed-effect environmental influences.
The work reported here is complementary to that of [1, 7] where the monotonicity
of the QoS of web services is considered. One other possible line of future research is
to extend the monotonicity properties of the assesments of non-recursive orchestrations
[2] to periodic orchestrations.
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